Abstract: Packet losses, an important class of adverse events in wireless sensor networks, can be caused by either misbehaving nodes, or attacks focused on the wireless links. Understanding the underlying cause is critical for effective response measures to restore network functionality. proposed an approach for fine-grained analysis (FGA) of packet losses that profiles the wireless links between the nodes using resident metrics, such as the received signal strength indicator (RSSI) and the link quality indicator (LQI), to accurately diagnose the root causes of the losses. In our work, we design an approach that enhances such previous approach by leveraging a statistical model for determining optimal system thresholds based on the variances of RSSI and LQI, and also supporting individual per-link thresholds. Our validation through real sensor data shows that our model is accurate and leads to an optimal fine-grained analysis of the underlying causes of packet losses.
Introduction
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are employed in several critical fields, including power grids, agriculture, cyber-physical infrastructures, healthcare monitoring, and homeland protection (Chipara et al., 2010; Virone et al., 2006) . Therefore, ensuring their security is of paramount importance. In particular, WSNs deployments cannot afford to lose service availability, while at the same time they must ensure reliable delivery of trustworthy data. However, the constrained and insecure nature of sensor nodes, together with the fully-distributed design of applications, makes satisfying such requirements very challenging. In fact, attackers can exploit vulnerable nodes to disrupt the network operation by altering data and hindering correct communication and delivery (Ko et al., 2010; Francillon and Castelluccia, 2008; Giannetsos et al., 2010) and to gain access to sensitive information. In order to detect such attacks at the time they happen, WSNs applications are often deployed with advanced intrusion detection systems (IDSs).
A particularly relevant class of attacks for WSNs is that of packet losses, in which a malicious party hinders the correct delivery of one or more data packets to the intended recipient. This class of attacks is critical to WSNs as it may result in crucial information being lost. Packet drops may occur because of actions by a misbehaving or compromised node, or of attack on the wireless links (Lim et al., 2012) . Both these types of attacks can ultimately result in partial or total packet loss. Examples of node-related attacks are selective forwarding and blackhole attacks, while an example of a link-related attack is the introduction of interference.
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While the two classes of packet loss attacks share the same symptoms, their root causes are significantly different. Correctly detecting the root causes for packet losseswhether link or node-related -is essential to the deployment of effective countermeasures, both manual or automated (Sultana et al., 2014) . Current IDSs, however, are typically only able to detect the adverse event, but not to determine the actual causes of the losses, whether node-or link-related (Pathan et al., 2006; Wang et al., 2007; Zia and Zomaya, 2006) . Thus, techniques to perform an accurate diagnosis of the underlying causes of packet losses in WSNs are critical. have proposed an approach to fine-grained analysis (FGA) of packet losses, and implemented and evaluated a tool based on this approach. The tool builds profiles for all the network links using resident packet metrics -such as the received signal strength indicator (RSSI), the link quality indicator (LQI) -and additional aggregated metrics -such as the packet reception rate (PRR). Upon the occurrence of a packet loss event, these profiles are used to carry out a thorough analysis and determine the underlying cause of the packet loss.
All the parameters for the tool, such as its detection thresholds, can be customised by the network administrator based on the requirements of the specific WSN of interest. Incorrectly setting the parameters can impact the accuracy of the analysis and, consequently, the correctness of the packet loss cause determination in face of subtle attacks. While the parameter values identified by were evaluated to be effective, an automated guidance to the choice of optimal values for such system parameters is of great importance. In fact, empirically-determined values, such as those proposed by , might not always be optimal. As a consequence, a higher number of false alarms would be produced, reducing the accuracy of the tool. Moreover, such previous approach uses a single threshold for the whole WSN. While this is aimed at reducing the workload for the network administrator, it can lead to an additional increase in false alarms. In fact, in a large-scale WSN deployment, different parts of the network might experience different normality conditions, and a single predefined threshold might be suitable for a network portion but inadequate for another. Last, the previous approach does not allow one to control the false alarm rate for each link. This means that it is not possible to require a priori a desired maximum rate of false detections.
In this work, we address the shortcomings of the approach by by designing an approach that builds and uses a statistical model for the determination of the optimal system thresholds. By collecting and analysing samples from the initial deployment of the WSN system, our approach builds an accurate statistical model of each link exploiting the variances of RSSI and LQI. Based on such model, our approach is able to select the optimal threshold for each link in the WSN. One of the advantages of our model is that it also supports the setting of a different threshold for each link. Such task is manually unfeasible for a network administrator, but can be effectively automated by our model. Moreover, since each threshold is tuned according to an optimum criterion, we can always choose a desired false alarm rate on a per-link basis and, if needed, exclude from the network all the links that will not be able to reach satisfactory detections.
In order to evaluate our approach, we carried out selective forwarding and interference attack scenarios on a real sensor testbed, and collected a significant amount of data samples for our statistical model. We leveraged extensive MATLAB simulations on such collected real-world sensor data, and verified in our experimental evaluation that our model is accurate and leads to well-tailored system parameters for an optimally-accurate FGA of the underlying causes of packet losses.
The remainder of this work is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the metrics used in the design of the system model. In Section 3, we discuss the rationale behind our model and its design. Then, we present the result of our evaluation in Section 4. We conclude the paper in Section 5.
System model
In this section, we first provide a formal definition of the main metrics involved on which our model is based. We then present an overview of our FFGA model.
WSN metrics formalisation
The radio chips based on the IEEE 802.15.4 standard (IEEE Standard, 2006) natively offer two main measurements for the link quality and estimation, namely RSSI and LQI.
The RSSI represents an estimate of the received signal power for a packet, and it is measured in dBm. The RSSI value at the distance d from the base station is described by the following equation (Tedeschi et al., 2014) :
where P T is the transmitter power, P L (d 0 ) is the path loss at a specific distance d 0 , and η is the path loss exponent. The shadowing factor X σ is a Gaussian random variable with values in dB and with standard deviation σ. The values of η and σ can be set depending on the propagation environment. Finally, the RSSI value is measured in dBm. The LQI reflects the chip error rate of the received signal and measures the signal reception quality. As defined in IEEE Standard (2006) , the LQI measurement is performed for each received packet and the obtained result is reported to the MAC sublayer of the radio chip. In addition, its value should be limited to the range [0, 255] with at least eight unique values. Unlike the RSSI, in the literature there is not an exact equation to compute the LQI, thus allowing manufacturers and vendors to define their own estimation method.
In this work, we refer to the TelosB motes (TelosB, http://www.memsic.com/userfiles/files/Datasheets/WSN/tel osb_datasheet.pdf) as our hardware platform of choice. Such platform uses a CC2420 radio chip, but our approach can be applied to any of the newer radios based on the IEEE 802.15.4 standard. As indicated in CC2420 (http://wwwmtl.mit.edu/Courses/6.111/labkit/datasheets/CC2420.pdf), the CC2420 radio chip calculates the RSSI value over an eight-symbol period, long on average 128 μs. The dynamic range for the RSSI is between -50 and -100, with higher values (less negative) representing a stronger signal. It is worth noting that, on the CC2420 chip, the manufacturer specifies that the read RSSI value is stored in the RSSI_VAL register of the chip, with a fixed offset of -45 dBm, as defined in (2).
According to the specifications of the IEEE 802.11.4 Standard, the RSSI value can be effectively used for both detecting noise on a channel, and estimating the quality of an incoming packet upon its reception. This property is leveraged by many protocols for optimal routing decisions (Gnawali et al., 2009) , and validated by several research efforts on the accuracy of the RSSI measurements themselves (Srinivasan and Levis, 2006; Chen and Terzis, 2006) .
The specifications of the CC2420 radio chip state that the measured LQI is actually the average correlation of each symbol obtained by comparing the symbol that is supposed to be received and the symbol actually received (signal plus noise), based on the 8 bits after the start frame delimiter (SFD). The correlation values range between 110 and 50, corresponding respectively to maximum and minimum quality frames. Once the correlation value is computed, it must be converted to the range . We refer the reader to (CC2420) for additional details. Finally, another important metric for link quality estimation is the PRR. It is not a value natively computed by the radio chip, but is instead an aggregated metric for each individual link, computed as the ratio between the number of packets successfully received and the number of packets sent. Higher values of the PRR indicate a better link quality and therefore a healthier communication medium.
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FGA overview
In the approach by , the FGA is composed of two main phases, namely the profiling and the investigation. We summarise such phases in the following, and refer the reader to for additional details. The profiling phase aims at understanding the quality of each link in the WSN under normal operating conditions, which is when no attack is undergoing. Upon the initial deployment of the network and its setup, the FGA system collects resident metrics and aggregate statistics about each link. To do so, each node in the WSN broadcasts a configurable number of dummy packets. Upon receiving the dummy packets of its direct neighbours, each node records the RSSI and LQI values. At the end of this initial message exchange, each node averages the values for each incoming link, and also computes the related PRR. The initial profiling phase, therefore, will terminate with every node having a profile in the form P = <AVG RSSI , AVG LQI , PRR> for each individual link.
When the IDS of a node detects that a packet drop attack has been carried out by a supposedly malicious node, say n bad , the investigation phase of the FGA is triggered to determine whether n bad is indeed a compromised node dropping packets, or if an interference is actually the cause for such loss. All the investigating nodes -that is, the direct neighbours of n bad -will stealthily start to collect metrics from the overheard packets coming from n bad . When a certain number of samples has been collected, the investigating nodes aggregate such data to obtain an investigation profile , , .
> The assumption at the base of the diagnosis is that a node-related attack will not significantly alter the quality metrics of the link, whereas a link-related attack, such as the introduction of interference, will result in noticeable changes in these quality metrics. The FGA tool therefore compares the initial profile P with the investigation profile .
P′ If the difference in their components exceeds a predefined threshold, it infers that the attack is link-related, otherwise it declares the attack as node-related.
A statistically-enhanced profiling technique
This section provides a deep-understanding of the motivations behind our new profiling approach providing a formal definition of the rationale of our procedure.
Motivations
The profiling techniques proposed by have proven to be very effective in discriminating between a wireless network affected by low/high interference (i.e., noise) or by a packet drop attack (either selective forwarding or blackhole attack). The analysis of the technique has however underlined two major drawbacks:
1 the threshold is only one for the entire network and it is not computed by observing the statistical trend of the RSSI and LQI for each link 2 the threshold is empirically evaluated (i.e., not tuned according to an optimality criterion).
Here, we move further by proposing a new profiling technique that can define an optimal threshold for each link in the network by exploiting the variances of the RSSI and LQI parameters. The problem is formulated as a conventional binary hypothesis test, where the two hypotheses H 0 and H 1 correspond, respectively, to the absence or presence of the attack of interest. We define as probability of detection (P D ) the probability of our system to correctly identify the presence of the attack, when it is actually performed. Conversely, we define as probability of false alarm (P FA ) the probability of our technique to declare the presence of the attack when it is actually not present. To limit the computational cost of the decision device, we choose some one-dimensional testing variables that are compared to a pre-selected threshold to efficiently perform the test. The optimal threshold for each link is tuned according to an optimality criterion (Moulines and Choukri, 1996) . We exploit the constant false alarm rate (CFAR) procedure, typically used to perform effective tests , as such an optimality criterion. The CFAR procedure refers to a common form of adaptive algorithm used in telecommunications systems to discriminate between the presence and absence of something (e.g., an unknown user in hidden communications), against a background of noise and interference . The CFAR criterion is applied, for each link, according to the following two steps: first, the threshold is determined that limits the false alarm probability at a given reduced value (i.e., the size of the test) under the null hypothesis H 0 ; then, the probability of detection, P D , (i.e., the power of the test) is evaluated under the alternate hypothesis H 1 for the threshold previously determined. The main idea behind our procedure is that the variance of the received signal (and hence the variance of the RSSI and LQI of the received packets) is lower when the link is affected by a packet drop attack (H 0 hypothesis), while it is higher in the alternate H 1 hypothesis (i.e., when the link is affected by low/high interference). As noted by , packet drop attacks do not change the statistics of the received signal in terms of RSSI and LQI. In fact, the aim of this kind of denial-of-service (DOS) attack is to discard the incoming packet and damage the communication among links. Conversely, the same consideration is not any longer valid in the presence of links affected by low/high interference. Therefore, we can select the variances of the received RSSI and LQI as the one-dimensional testing variables to compare with the optimal thresholds. Hence, our variance-based test can be effective in discriminating between cases of a packet drop attacks by nodes and the presence of low/high interference. In addition, since these considerations apply to each link in the network, we can first identify the most appropriate threshold, and then evaluate the detection performance for each network link.
Rationale
The rationale behind our method is as follows. The IDS of a node has declared the presence of an anomaly (i.e., some kind of attack) in the network. This declaration is based on the observation of the PRR values, as done in . This allows us to discriminate between the following two hypotheses:
H 0 The WSN is affected by a packet drop attack.
H 1 The WSN is affected by an interference attack.
The decision about the presence or absence of an interference attack in a certain link of the WSN can be obtained by comparing the decision metric to the pre-selected threshold. In the case of our interest, the decision metric (or decision variable) is the variance of the RSSI and LQI of the received packets on that link. Let u(n), i(n) and x(n) be the sequences (of N samples) representing, respectively, the (useful) transmitted signal, the interference affecting the communication in the network, and the received signal. Since node-related packet dropping attacks do not change the signal statistics, the problem can be formulated as follows:
Then, assuming that the signal and the interference are zero-mean, mutually independent random processes, the two hypotheses result in: 
where E[..] stands for the expectation operator. Then, considering a threshold η, the test is finally formulated as follows:
::
This means that, if the testing variable is greater than the threshold value (η), then the algorithm decides for the hypothesis H 1 (i.e. interference attack); otherwise the choice is for the hypothesis H 0 (i.e. packet drop attack). Finally, it has to be noted that the testing variable in (6) is asymptotically (N → ∞) Gaussian as a direct consequence of the central limit theorem. Hence, the test threshold can be asymptotically tuned from a straightforward evaluation of the Gaussian integral for a fixed probability of false alarm, under (i.e., conditioned to) the null-hypothesis : 
Statistical profiling comparison algorithm
Figure 1 shows our profile comparison algorithm which exploits the rationale previously introduced. The PRR curr is set to the current PRR of the node under investigation by its neighbours and it is compared with a preselected threshold set by the administrator of the network. The PRR allows our method to differentiate the two cases of partial and total packet loss. Unlike the previous technique, the new profiling technique requires to re-profile the links of the investigating nodes which are direct neighbours of n bad . In this step, each node creates a new investigation profile , , ,
> where Z RSSI and Z LQI are respectively the testing variable for the test based on the RSSI and the LQI. Finally, η RSSI and η LQI are the optimal thresholds computed during the deployment of the networks exploiting the CFAR criterion. Finally, when P RRcurr ≥ PRR tresh , the profile comparison algorithm of each neighbour node would need to re-profile the link that connects the node with n bad . If P RRcurr < PRR tresh , the profile comparison algorithm would need to re-profile all its links and compare the new profile with the pre-selected optimal thresholds.
Evaluation results
In this section, we report some experimental results validating our theoretical approach and assessing the efficiency of the proposed profiling technique. The WSN setup consists of 16 TelosB sensors placed in a 4 × 4 grid. These nodes use the CC2420 radio chip, natively providing the RSSI and LQI measurements for each received packet. Through these experiments, we have evaluated the impact of the interference and the selective forwarding attacks. We also briefly discuss the performance of our statistically-enhanced approach when varying the precision of the samples used for the analysis. Figure 2 shows a snapshot of the network portion under the attack of a Jammer node (J) involved in our tests, highlighting in Figure 2 (b) the communication links among the networks nodes.
Interference attack
In order to conduct the experiments, we first collected a large amount of real data during the deployment of our WSN, when working properly without any interference (H 0 hypothesis). Then, we estimated the variance of the received RSSI and LQI parameters according to expression (6), and finally tuned the optimal theoretical threshold using expression (8).
It is important to mention that the number of testing variables, used to estimate the mean and variance in (8), directly impacts the threshold tuning. More test variables allow one to set a finer threshold corresponding to the P FA targets (according to the CFAR procedure), while fewer test variables result in a rougher threshold setting with an actual P FA not according to the CFAR procedure. Another important aspect is the number of samples used to compute the test variables which directly impacts on the P D of the test. As shown in Figure 3 , increasing the number of samples enhances the system performance, providing higher accuracy in the process of estimating the RSSI (and LQI) variances. Hence, in order to compute the optimal set of thresholds and to estimate the testing variables, it is important to find an appropriate trade-off between the number of samples and testing variables which allows us to reach the maximum level of accuracy. ). We have evaluated P D both analytically, i.e., using expression (6), and experimentally.
In order to successfully conduct the experiments, a sensor acting as a jammer introduces different levels of interference in the WSN communications; such sensor is located at the centre of the network, as shown in Figure 2 . The interference level varied from low, to medium and high values in order to collect the results at several signal-to-noise ratios (SNR) of practical interest. Here, we report the obtained results for links: 2-3, 2-7, and 4-5. We select these links in order to evaluate how the interference impacts the communication links close to the interference source (i.e., link 4-5) and far from it (link 2-3). In all the considered cases, we have that the simulation results (dotted lines) well match the theoretical ones (solid lines), thus validating the correctness of the mathematical analysis and assumptions. As the SNR increases (from -5 dB to 10 dB, i.e., the attacker changes the interference level from high to medium-low interference), the performance of the proposed FGA technique decreases, as expected. In fact, if the level of the interference by the attacker (or jammer) is too low, the statistics of the received signals do not change in time and it becomes impossible for the sensor to discriminate between interference and a selective forwarding attack. However, notice that we are able to obtain a true detection (higher than 80%) in the presence of a low interference (at about SNR = 0-2 dB), even at a very low false alarm probability (i.e., P FA = 10 -4
). To fully assess the performance of our profiling method, we have investigated how the detection and false alarm probabilities relate to each other.
The receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve illustrates the performance of our binary profiling method as its discrimination threshold is varied. The ROC curve is created by plotting the detection probability against the false alarm probability at various threshold settings. Ideally, all the ROC curves must be above the line P D = P FA (bisector) and concave downward. Paradoxically, if they were not, a randomised test would be better. The best performing detector presents the minimum distance from the ideal point (P D = 100% and P FA = 0%) in its ROC curve. An effective operating point is just the point of the curve near such an optimum case. Figure 7 shows the theoretical ROC curves, i.e. P D vs. P FA , of our profiling technique for several values of the SNR. In particular, Figure 7 (a) refers to using the RSSI variance for the test, while Figure 7 (b) refers to the use of the LQI variance-based test. For sake of simplicity, only the theoretical curves are reported in Figure 7 , since the experimental data again perfectly overlap with the theoretical ones. It is interesting to note that our method is able to identify a true detection (with a P D > 80%) even in the presence of an interference attack with a SNR of 3 dB, allowing the target P FA to increase from 10 -4 to 10 -2
. Hence, our test needs to work with lower SNR values, to maintain the same level of detection, thus decreasing the false alarm rate. As we can see from those results, larger detection probabilities are achieved also in the presence of (low-power) interference attacks, thus demonstrating the effectiveness of our test for fine-grained diagnosis of packet losses in WSNs.
Selective forwarding
To test our proposed approach against a selective forwarding attack, we configured some nodes to act as compromised nodes, dropping the packets they were supposed to forward with a 20% probability. The experiments exploit 1,000 testing variables for each link of the network, estimating the variance of the received RSSI/LQI values over N = 100 samples. For sake of simplicity, we report only the theoretical probability of detection of the considered attack for some of the network's links. As shown in the results in Table 1 , even in the case of a selective forwarding attack the probability of a correct detection provided by our algorithm is very high, (i.e., always over 99%). These results show the robustness of our approach in detecting the selective forwarding attacks. Table 1 The theoretical probability of detection of the proposed method in presence of a selective forwarding attacks for several relevant links 
Sample precision
Statistical analysis approaches work at their best potential, as one would expect, when the precision of the samples used for the analysis is as high as possible. Unfortunately, the RSSI and LQI values provided by the hardware platform to the software layer are truncated integer values. We evaluate how the accuracy of our statistical approach changes with different precisions of the collected samples. For this, we use MATLAB to generate sequences of samples (based on the mean and the variance of the data collected from our real testbed) with a precision of six decimal places. Then, we take the same dataset and truncate all the samples to integer values. We then apply our approach to both the decimal and integer dataset of samples to evaluate whether the loss in sample precision has an impact on the accuracy of the analysis. For the sake of compactness, we report in Figure 8 the results of our simulation based on the two datasets -that is, both truncated and in double precision -of the links 2-7 and 4-5 at different values of P FA , i.e. 10 -2 and 10 -3
. In particular, Figures 8(a) and 8(c) refer to the observations of the RSSI variance, while Figures 8(b) and 8(d) illustrate the case of the LQI variance for the considered link. A simple analysis of the experimental results shows that our rationale based on variance is robust even for low-precision samples, i.e. the integer values, as the detection rate is comparable for both datasets. In particular, the analysis shows that this similarity is stronger when the two nodes are close (e.g., link 4-5) and decreases of few percentage points when the distance separating the two nodes increases (e.g., link 2-7).
As a future research direction in the area of sensor hardware, we advocate that it could be useful to enable the sensor hardware and software layer to produce RSSI and LQI values with a higher precision, as this could potentially enable other statistical approaches that better leverage decimal samples.
Related works
The use of forensic analysis for investigating packet losses in WSNs has been addressed in few past research efforts. Ning et al. (2012) proposed a forensic technique that uses several network parameters -such as bitrate, packet size and node density -to determine the cause of forwarding misbehaviours. A more collaborative approach has been proposed by Yang et al. (2009) , which leverage all nodes to monitor their neighbours and to ensure that everyone correctly forwards data packets. These approaches focus more on distinguishing natural and malicious packet losses, while our approach addresses the identification of the root cause of packet drops. Moreover, in comparison, our approach determines the cause of packet losses relying on fewer parameters. While the detection of packet dropping attacks has been the focus of several IDS-related approaches, identifying the root cause of such adverse events by means of common network parameters has been investigated significantly less. The work in Draves et al. (2004) used an expected transmission time metric as weight for each link. In a similar fashion, an expected transmission count metric developed by Couto et al. (2003) aimed at estimating the packet delivery ratio of the various links. Both these metrics aim at assessing the packet loss rate; however, neither of them investigates the cause of packet losses. Qiu et al. (2006) used trace-driven simulations to troubleshoot performance issues caused by link congestion, packet dropping, MAC misbehaviour, and external noise. Ramach et al. (2004) , instead, proposed a generic architecture to monitor many parameters of network devices and protocols. While both these approaches leverage evidence collected processes as we do in our approach, their goal is to diagnose performance problems, while we aim at determining the most likely cause of packet losses. The RSSI and LQI metrics are also used for purposes different than ours, mostly related to localisation of devices and sensor nodes. RSSI reading were used by Zàruba et al. (2007) for indoor positioning of wireless nodes using only a single access point. However, Parameswaran et al. (2009) showed that, while the sole RSSI is sufficient for localisation algorithms, the accuracy of inter-node distance measurements is often affected by factors such as interference. This further corroborates our finding on the effectiveness of those resident packet parameters in detecting interference. Srinivasan and Levis (2006) found that combining RSSI and LQI is effective for localisation even in presence of obstacles or interference.
None of these approaches, however, makes use of an extensive statistical analysis of the metrics to detect the presence of interference, as we do in our approach.
We originally proposed the statistically-enhanced FGA technique in . In the current work, we enhance our technique by addressing some limitations of the original approach. First, our previous work heavily relied on MATLAB-simulated synthetic data that, even though based on real-world samples, could miss some of the implications of a real wireless communication medium. In our current work, we use data samples collected from a real sensor testbed, to evaluate the accuracy of our approach. Second, in our previous work we focused on interference attacks as a means to validate our model. In the current work, we extend our evaluation by also carrying out node-related attacks, such as selective forwarding and blackhole attacks. Last, in our current work, we acknowledge that the link metrics provided by the hardware platform (namely, RSSI and LQI) lack in decimal precision -a condition usually important for statistical methods. Therefore, we analyse more in-depth the implications of the precision of the input data on the accuracy of our model, by comparing the performance of our system with synthetic decimal-precision samples versus truncated integer values, and show that our model is robust even when scarcely-precise data samples are used. Last, in this current work, we provide a broader comparison with the state-of-the-art, detailing differences with several related approaches.
Conclusions
In this work, we presented an approach that builds a statistical model for optimally-accurate FGA of the underlying causes of packet losses in WSNs, whether node-or link-related. Our model exploits the variances of RSSI and LQI to determine an individual, optimal detection threshold for each link. In addition, the proposed approach allows us to have control on the PFA through the CFAR criterion. In our experiment, we have tested the both the performance and the robustness of our model in presence of interference (i.e., the attacker changes the interference level from high to medium-low) and selective forwarding attacks. The experimental results validate the robustness of our model in detecting the considered attacks and its performance. In addition, the provided results underline also the optimality of its system parameters under the constant false alarm rate criterion.
For the future development of our research, we plan to further evaluate the effectiveness of our approach in more complex scenarios, as well as comparing the system performance with machine learning methods, such as neural networks and naive Bayes classifiers.
